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OPINION 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
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 Appellant D.F. was a five-year-old kindergartener 
during the 2008-2009 school year, his first under the 
supervision of Appellee Collingswood Borough Board of 
Education (―Collingswood‖).  He had previously been 
educated in the Camden school system, which had identified 
him as a special needs student and developed an 
Individualized Education Plan (―IEP‖) for him.  
Collingswood adopted the Camden IEP in substantial part, 
with the consent of D.F.‘s mother, A.C.  In January 2009, 
A.C. filed a due process petition alleging violation of D.F.‘s 
rights under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act 
(―IDEA‖).  Sometime later, she filed a second due process 
petition expanding the claims.  D.F. and A.C. subsequently 
moved out of state, at which point the New Jersey 
Administrative Law Judge (―ALJ‖) dismissed the pending 
due process petitions as moot.  D.F. filed this suit in the 
District Court challenging the ALJ‘s orders.  The parties filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment and the District Court 
granted Collingswood‘s motion, thereby upholding the ALJ‘s 
orders.  D.F. timely appealed.   
 We must now resolve three questions: (1) whether the 
out-of-state move rendered all of D.F.‘s claims moot; (2) if 
the claims are not moot, whether summary judgment was 
nonetheless proper because D.F.‘s IDEA rights were not 
violated; and (3) whether D.F. was a prevailing party for 
purposes of attorneys‘ fees.  We hold that the District Court 
erred in determining that the claims were moot and in 
entering summary judgment.  It correctly found that D.F. was 
not a prevailing party entitled to attorneys‘ fees.  We 
therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case 
to the District Court for further factual development.    
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I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  2008 
 D.F., an African-American male with special 
educational needs, was enrolled in an inclusion
1
 pre-school 
class in the Camden City Public Schools for the 2007-2008 
school year.  There were fewer than ten students in the class, 
supervised by four adults.  According to the IEP generated in 
Camden, he exhibited characteristics consistent with 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (―ADHD‖) and 
Oppositional Defiant Disorder (―ODD‖).  (Appellant‘s App. 
8.)  Although his cognitive abilities were at or above grade 
level, he had difficulty with visual-motor integration skills.  
Generally speaking, he experienced problems with 
hyperactivity, aggression, distractibility, and impulsivity.  In 
Camden, D.F. had experienced issues with throwing objects, 
hitting peers, running away, and temper tantrums.  Once a 
Behavior Intervention Plan (―BIP‖) was created, his negative 
behaviors began to diminish.   
 The IEP required an extended school year program 
(―ESY‖) of at least thirty days, in a self-contained2 behavioral 
disabilities program with counseling services.  This summer 
program was intended to modify his aggressive and impulsive 
behaviors before he entered a regular kindergarten with 
support services in September 2008.  The IEP specifically 
                                              
1
 Inclusion classrooms educate special needs and typically 
developing children together.  
2
 Unlike inclusion classrooms, self-contained classrooms 
educate only special needs children. 
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noted that D.F. would be at high risk for failure in a regular 
kindergarten without supportive services.   
 D.F. and his family moved to Collingswood, a suburb 
of Camden, in September 2008 and enrolled D.F. in 
Collingswood schools.
3
  The IEP team in Collingswood 
essentially adopted the IEP developed in Camden.  The team 
consisted of a case manager, D.F.‘s regular education teacher, 
his special education teacher, a psychologist, and A.C.  A.C. 
declined to have D.F. placed in the self-contained special 
education kindergarten because his brother was in that class.  
It is indisputable that D.F. was placed in a regular classroom, 
with typically developing children and pull-out sessions for 
speech and counseling.  D.F. had no one-to-one aide or other 
supportive services in that regular kindergarten classroom.   
 Although the behavior plan from Camden remained 
part of D.F.‘s IEP, it was not implemented in Collingswood, 
and he experienced behavioral issues in the early part of the 
school year.  On November 19, 2008, A.C. requested that a 
functional behavior assessment of D.F. be performed, in 
hopes of addressing D.F.‘s behavioral issues.  Collingswood 
agreed.  Philip Concors, a certified behavior analyst with 
whom Collingswood frequently works, performed the 
assessment.  
                                              
3
 According to the 2010 census, the Borough of Collingswood 
is approximately eighty-two percent white.  U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2010 Census Summary File 1.   
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B. Spring 2009 
 On January 8, 2009, Collingswood began providing 
D.F. with a one-to-one aide in the classroom. 
 A.C., initially unrepresented by counsel, filed a due 
process petition on January 21, 2009.  She alleged that 
Collingswood had placed D.F. in a regular classroom and had 
failed to provide the one-to-one aide until January, in 
violation of the IEP.  She also alleged that he had been 
subject to discipline without consideration of the fact that his 
behavior was a manifestation of his disability.  Finally, she 
asserted that the IEP and behavior plan were incomplete 
because they did not include specific target behaviors, 
methods, and documentation processes, and because they 
were not developed from the baseline of a behavior 
assessment.  The petition sought: 1) an independent 
psychiatric evaluation; 2) an independent behavioral 
assessment and a positive behavior intervention plan designed 
by a consultant who would oversee it; 3) compensatory 
education for the period of time D.F. did not have a one-to-
one aide; 4) an ESY; and 5) a requirement that the IEP 
include proper goals and objectives. 
 By filing the petition, A.C. triggered the IDEA‘s ―stay-
put‖ requirement.  Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), the child 
who is the subject of due process proceedings ―shall remain 
in [his] then-current educational placement . . . until all such 
proceedings have been completed.‖  Approximately a month 
after the filing of the petition, Collingswood conducted an 
IEP meeting at which it implemented a behavior plan based 
on Concors‘ evaluation.  The plan specifically approved the 
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use of physical restraints on D.F.  A.C. refused to attend this 
meeting, although she was part of the IEP team.  She argued 
that the stay-put requirement mandated continuation of the 
old IEP until the ALJ held otherwise.   
 In March 2009, Collingswood filed a motion to 
dismiss the second claim in the petition, which sought an 
independent psychiatric evaluation and an independent 
behavioral assessment.  Collingswood argued that A.C. had 
not requested them before she filed the petition, as she was 
required to do under New Jersey law.  Collingswood also 
claimed that it had already agreed to provide them.  D.F. 
argues to this Court that, although Collingswood has 
repeatedly represented to the ALJ that it agreed to provide 
these evaluations at its own expense, using the experts 
provided by A.C., it stalled for five months.  In June 2009, the 
ALJ ordered that Collingswood pay for the evaluations.   
 D.F. remained in the regular classroom, with an aide, 
through April 2009.  There were numerous incidents 
involving his behavior, including some in which he was 
physically aggressive toward other students, his aide, and 
other adults in the building.  (Appellant‘s App. 64-69.)  
Parents of other students in his class became upset with his 
presence in the classroom and even organized online to 
agitate for his removal from the classroom.   
 Toward the close of the 2008-2009 school year, the 
IEP team met again and proposed an out-of-district placement 
for D.F.  Collingswood sent A.C. a letter seeking her 
authorization to send D.F.‘s records to several out-of-district 
programs so that those programs could determine whether 
they would accept him as a student.  A.C. refused, invoking 
her stay-put rights. 
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 Apparently as a result of her frustration with the use of 
restraints against D.F. and his treatment in the classroom, 
A.C. unilaterally decided to keep D.F.  at home for the last six 
weeks of the school year.  D.F.‘s IEP required an ESY, and 
Collingswood provided D.F. with tutoring in a vacant 
classroom during that summer.  It was A.C.‘s opinion that this 
placement violated the IEP, which provided that ESY be in a 
self-contained classroom.  (Appellant‘s App. 80-81.)4  
C. 2009-2010 Academic Year 
 D.F. began the 2009 school year in a regular classroom 
with a one-to-one aide.  His behavior problems continued.  In 
late August, Collingswood filed for emergent relief, seeking a 
change in D.F.‘s stay-put status so that it could officially 
implement the behavior intervention plan that was designed at 
the February 2009 IEP meeting and which had, arguably, 
been in use unofficially in the spring of 2009.  In the 
alternative, Collingswood sought to place D.F. outside the 
district and asked that the ALJ order A.C. to authorize the 
release of D.F.‘s records for this purpose.  The ALJ denied 
this motion without prejudice, as Collingswood had failed to 
include any facts relating to the current school year. 
 In September 2009, D.F.‘s chosen expert, Dr. Kathleen 
McCabe-Odri, completed her functional behavior assessment 
and his second expert, Dr. Robertson Tucker, completed his 
psychiatric evaluation.  Dr. McCabe-Odri observed D.F. at 
                                              
4
 Later, in September 2009, A.C. filed for compensatory 
education for the hours of IEP-approved education lost during 
the ESY.  This motion was eventually denied as moot along 
with the others. 
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home and in his classroom.  She concluded that ―the overall 
behavior system is severely inadequate in addressing [D.F.‘s] 
behavioral and social challenges.‖  (Appellant‘s App. 141.)  
She recommended particular behavior intervention strategies 
and suggested that the Collingswood staff would benefit from 
certain training.  Finally, she concluded that restraints were 
not recommended for D.F.  (Id. at 143.)   
 Dr. Tucker recommended a ―highly structured first 
grade class which offers support services and a full-time one-
to-one aide providing behavior modification instead of 
resorting to restraint.‖   (Id. at 133.)  He also indicated that 
restraints were contraindicated in most situations and that 
D.F. should receive social skills training and counseling in 
school.   
 On October 29, Collingswood again sought emergent 
relief, this time seeking only an out-of-district placement for 
D.F.  It based the request on a number of fall 2009 disruptive 
incidents, in which D.F.‘s behavior escalated to the point that 
he punched , scratched and hit teachers, hit other students, ran 
out of classrooms, and ripped up other students‘ work.  The 
ALJ found that D.F‘s behavior placed him and students 
around him at risk of harm and therefore ordered that D.F. be 
placed on home instruction until a suitable placement in a 
highly structured setting with behavioral supports was found.  
The ALJ further ordered A.C. to cooperate in the process of 
finding him an out-of-district placement.   
 In early December, Collingswood informed A.C. that 
The Archway School had accepted D.F.  A.C. refused to send 
D.F. to Archway without a new IEP and stated that she would 
not cooperate in the development of a new IEP until ordered 
by the ALJ to do so.  D.F. was still on home instruction in 
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February 2010, when A.C. indicated at a hearing that she 
would prefer that D.F. be placed at the Cherrywood School, 
run by Dr. McCabe-Odri.  Cherrywood was primarily a 
school for autistic pre-schoolers, and the district argued that it 
was not an appropriate placement.  Cherrywood staff 
submitted an affidavit describing the Collingwood staff‘s tour 
of Cherrywood, at which Dr. Plescia, head of special 
education for Collingswood, allegedly referred to D.F. as ―a 
predator,‖ ―the devil,‖ ―street smart,‖ and highly aggressive.‖  
(Appellant‘s App. 193-94.) 
 The parties failed to agree on a placement, and, on 
April 1, 2010, the ALJ entered an order finding Archway to 
be the appropriate placement and changing D.F.‘s stay-put to 
place him there.  (Id. at 203.)  A.C. appealed and did not send 
D.F. to Archway.   
D. Conclusion of the Case Before the ALJ 
 On July 7, 2010, D.F.‘s counsel advised Collingswood 
that D.F. and A.C. had moved to Georgia and that they would 
be withdrawing all claims except those for compensatory 
education. 
 On July 15, D.F. filed a second petition for due 
process,
5
 nearly identical to the first except that it sought, as 
its sole relief, compensatory education for ―the period of time 
Collingswood failed to provide a free and appropriate 
education in the least restrictive environment.‖  (Appellant‘s 
App. 215.)  This represented an expansion from the initial 
                                              
5
 This petition was later referred to by the ALJ as a motion to 
amend the original petition.  See footnote 6, infra. 
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petition, which had sought compensatory education only for 
the time period before the one-to-one aide was initially 
provided.  This petition also alleged that restraints had been 
improperly used on D.F.  Collingswood filed a Notice of 
Insufficiency, alleging that D.F. had failed to plead specific 
issues, relevant facts, and relief sought with regard to the 
restraints.  The ALJ entered an order dismissing the new 
petition for insufficiency on July 27, the same day on which 
he was made aware that D.F. had moved out of state.   
 On August 4, the ALJ issued an order dismissing all 
remaining claims and closing the case.  (Appellant‘s App. 
237-41.)  D.F. had conceded that the move rendered moot all 
the claims except those for compensatory education.  The 
ALJ, however, denied the motion to amend the petition to 
expand the compensatory education claim, finding both 
undue delay and mootness.
6
  The ALJ then dismissed both 
pending petitions – one filed by D.F. and one by 
Collingswood – as moot.       
                                              
6
 D.F. had, in fact, filed a Motion to Amend in May 2009, but 
the ALJ stated that the petitioner had delayed seeking 
amendment of the claim for ―well over a year.‖  (Appellant‘s 
App. 240.)  Since May 2009 was less than six months after 
the filing of the initial petition, the ALJ‘s holding appears to 
refer instead to the second due process petition, filed in July 
2010.   
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E. District Court Proceedings 
 D.F. originally filed a complaint in the District Court 
on February 3, 2010, appealing the November 6 order of the 
ALJ that placed him on home instruction.  The District Court 
case proceeded in tandem with the case before the ALJ 
throughout the spring and summer.  After D.F. amended the 
complaint several times, the parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment. 
 The District Court granted Collingswood‘s summary 
judgment motion and entered judgment in its favor.  
Engaging in plenary review of the ALJ‘s decision, while 
giving ―due weight‖ to the ALJ‘s factual findings, the District 
Court held that ―the present dispute ha[d] been rendered moot 
by D.F.‘s move from New Jersey to Georgia.‖  D.F. v. 
Collingswood Pub. Sch., 804 F. Supp. 2d 250, 255 (D.N.J. 
2011).  It noted that all compensatory education claims are 
rendered moot by a child‘s move out of a school district.  
However, several of the orders on appeal concerned the 
appropriate placement for D.F., and one concerned use of 
restraints against him.  The Court found itself unable to award 
relief if it held in D.F.‘s favor on these issues, particularly in 
the form of compensatory education.   
  With regard to the remaining order on appeal, the 
August 4 dismissal for mootness, the District Court found that 
it was also without power to award compensatory education 
as relief.  Because D.F. had voluntarily moved to Georgia, 
that state had ―necessarily assumed the obligation to evaluate 
D.F.‘s educational needs as they currently exist and provide 
him with a FAPE and any necessary special education 
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services.‖  Id.  In a footnote, the Court also held that ―D.F.‘s 
claim for compensatory education for the period of time he 
was not provided a one-to-one aide also fails on the merits 
because Collingswood did not deny him a FAPE during that 
period.‖  Id. at 256 n.6.  Essentially, it found that the IEP 
never required a one-to-one aide and that Collingswood acted 
swiftly to remediate the situation once it was discovered.  It 
did not address the other denials of FAPE alleged. 
 Finally, the Court declined to award attorneys‘ fees to 
D.F. on the basis of prevailing party status.  It found that there 
was no causal connection between the filing of the petition 
and Collingswood‘s provision of the independent 
assessments, as D.F. had not properly requested these 
assessments before filing for due process.  Id. at 256-57.   
 D.F. filed a timely notice of appeal. 
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 Pursuant to the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2), the 
District Court had jurisdiction over the appeal from the state 
administrative proceedings.  We have jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 Summary judgment is appropriate ―where the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, 
and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.‖  Azur v. Chase Bank, USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 601 F.3d 
212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 
798, 805-06 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 
14 
 
56(c))).
7
  In an IDEA case, our review of the District Court‘s 
legal conclusions is de novo, Steven I. v. Cent. Bucks Sch. 
Dist., 618 F.3d 411, 412 n.2 (3d Cir. 2010), and our review of 
the District Court‘s factual findings is for clear error.  L.E. v. 
Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 389 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 ―This court reviews the District Court's denial of 
attorneys' fees for abuse of discretion. . . .  However, if the 
District Court denied the fees based on its conclusions on 
questions of law, our review is plenary.‖  P.N. v. Clementon 
Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation 
omitted).   
III.  ANALYSIS 
A. Mootness 
 D.F. argues that his move to Georgia did not render 
moot his claims for compensatory education, as the District 
Court determined.   
 Compensatory education is a judicially-created remedy 
that has received the imprimatur of this Court.  Lester H. v. 
Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1990).  The IDEA grants a 
                                              
7
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 was revised in 2010.  The standard 
previously set forth in subsection (c) is now codified as 
subsection (a).  The language of this subsection is unchanged, 
except for ―one word — genuine ‗issue‘ bec[ame] genuine 
‗dispute.‘‖  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee‘s note, 
2010 amend. 
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district court reviewing an IDEA claim the authority to grant 
whatever relief it ―determines is appropriate.‖  20 U.S.C. § 
1415(i)(2).  The Supreme Court has held that if parents have 
paid for a disabled child‘s education because the public 
schools were failing to provide FAPE, reimbursement of this 
tuition constitutes appropriate relief.  Sch. Comm. of 
Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985).8  The 
Court found that any other result would render ―the child‘s 
right to a free appropriate public education, the parents‘ right 
to participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the 
procedural safeguards . . . less than complete.‖  Id.  Since this 
could not have been Congress‘s intent, the Court was 
confident that ―Congress meant to include retroactive 
reimbursement to parents as an available remedy in a proper 
case.‖  Id.   
 In Miener ex rel. Miener v. State of Missouri, the 
Eighth Circuit extended this rationale to countenance the 
award of compensatory educational services, that is, those 
educational services that a special needs student ought to have 
received during the period of time that FAPE was not 
provided.  800 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1986).  As in the case of the 
reimbursement remedy approved in Burlington, the Court 
found that ―imposing liability for compensatory educational 
services on the defendants ‗merely requires [them] to 
                                              
8
 This case addressed the the Education of the Handicapped 
Act (EHA), the predecessor statute to the IDEA.  EHA 
jurisprudence concerning appropriate remedies has, however, 
been incorporated wholesale into IDEA jurisprudence.  See, 
e.g., Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 612 F.3d 712, 718 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (addressing IDEA compensatory education claim 
by citing Burlington‘s analysis of the EHA). 
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belatedly pay expenses that [they] should have paid all 
along.‘‖  Id. at 753 (quoting Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71).  
As for the policy goals of the IDEA, the Court was confident 
―that Congress did not intend the child‘s entitlement to a free 
education to turn upon her parent‘s ability to ‗front‘ its costs.‖  
Id. at 753.   
 We adopted these conclusions in Lester H. v. Gilhool, 
916 F.2d at 872-73. We concluded ―that Congress, by 
allowing the courts to fashion an appropriate remedy to cure 
the deprivation of a child‘s right to a free appropriate public 
education, did not intend to offer a remedy only to those 
parents able to afford an alternative private education.‖  Id. at 
873. 
  Acknowledging that compensatory education was a 
potentially valid remedy, the District Court nonetheless 
determined that D.F.‘s claims were moot.  804 F. Supp. 2d at 
255.  Because the judicial power extends only to cases and 
controversies., U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, a claim is moot if no 
such case or controversy exists.  ―[T]he requirement that an 
action involve a live case or controversy extends through all 
phases of litigation . . .‖  Cnty. of Morris v. Nationalist 
Movement, 273 F.3d 527, 533 (3d Cir. 2001).  Accordingly, if  
―developments occur during the course of adjudication that 
eliminate a plaintiff's personal stake in the outcome of a suit 
or prevent a court from being able to grant the requested 
relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.‖  Id. (quoting 
Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d 
Cir. 1996)).  
 Admittedly, ―[c]ase law in this Circuit addressing the 
effect of moving out of a school district during the course of 
litigation for compensatory education is spotty.‖  N.P. v. East 
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Orange Bd. of Educ., No. 06-5130, 2011 WL 463037, at *4 
(D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2011).  We have not squarely addressed the 
question, and we certainly have not done so in the context of 
an out-of-state move.  We have, however, stated that 
compensatory education is an equitable remedy that 
compensates a special needs student ―for rights the district 
already denied him.‖  Lester H., 916 F.2d at 872.  Thus, 
several District Courts within this Circuit have held that an 
out-of-district move does not render claims for compensatory 
education moot.  N.P., 2011 WL 463037, at *5 (granting 
compensatory education to student who had moved to 
adjacent school district while explicitly limiting ruling to in-
state move situation); Neshaminy Sch. Dist. v. Karla B., No. 
96-3865, 1997 WL 137197, at *5-*6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 1997) 
(finding compensatory education claim not mooted by out-of-
district move).  The Eighth Circuit also has held that an out-
of-district move does not moot a claim for compensatory 
education.  Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 284 v. A.C. ex rel. C.C., 258 
F.3d 769, 774-75 (8th Cir. 2001).        
 The District Court, like the ALJ, relied heavily on the 
one District Court decision within the Third Circuit that holds 
that a compensatory education claim is rendered moot by a 
move out of state.  In S.N. v. Old Bridge Twp. Bd. of Educ., 
No. 04-517, 2006 WL 3333138 (D.N.J. 2006), the court 
dismissed S.N.‘s claim as moot.  However, it focused on the 
fact that S.N. sought ―prospective relief, which would be 
impossible to grant.‖  Id. at *2.  S.N. had originally sought 
only a revised IEP, and only in response to the motion to 
dismiss for mootness did he seek to amend his prayer for 
relief to ask for reimbursement of the costs of hiring a life 
coach.  Id.  The court did specifically address the question of 
compensatory education, and it found that, given the move 
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out of state and the fact that S.N.‘s parents had not fronted 
money for his education while he lived in New Jersey, 
―Plaintiffs‘ own actions have made any relief, including an 
award [of] compensatory education, impossible.‖  Id. at *4 
(sic). 
 S.N., an unpublished decision of the District Court, is 
neither persuasive nor binding.  Continuity of residence 
cannot be prerequisite to the grant of compensatory 
education.  As the Neshaminy court noted, a rule that 
rendered IDEA claims for compensatory education moot 
upon a move out of district would allow ―a school district [to] 
simply stop providing required services to a student with the 
underlying motive of inducing this student to move from the 
district, thus removing any future obligation under IDEA 
which the district may owe to the student,‖ and thereby 
frustrating the purpose of the IDEA.  Neshaminy Sch. Dist., 
1997 WL 137197, at *6.  We find this rationale indisputably 
persuasive.   
 The IDEA works because each school district bears the 
obligation to educate special needs students, often at 
substantial cost.  See Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. 
DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2007) (―It is 
undisputed that the District is the local education agency 
responsible for providing a FAPE to [the student].‖).  To 
comply with the IDEA, a school district no longer responsible 
for educating a child must still be held responsible for its past 
transgressions.  Were we to uphold the District Court‘s ruling, 
we would create an enormous loophole in that obligation and 
thereby substantially weaken the IDEA‘s protections.  We 
therefore hold that a claim for compensatory education is not 
rendered moot by an out-of-district move, even if that move 
takes the child out of state.   
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 Ruling otherwise would particularly impact low-
income special needs students.  Because compensatory 
education is at issue only when tuition reimbursement is not, 
it is implicated only where parents could not afford to ―front‖ 
the costs of a child‘s education.  See Miener, 800 F.2d at 753.  
Accordingly, low-income families, disproportionately likely 
to have a disabled child, would be particularly burdened by a 
holding that compensatory education cannot be obtained after 
a move.  See U.S. Dep‘t of Educ., Office of Special Educ. 
And Rehab. Servs., 25th Annual Report to Cong. on the 
Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act Vol. 1, 32 (2003), available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/osep/2003/25th-vol-
1-sec-1.pdf.   We cannot reward school districts who fail to 
provide FAPE to special education students until those 
students move.     
 The District Court asserted that, apparently because 
D.F. moved out of state, Georgia ―has necessarily assumed 
the obligation to evaluate D.F.‘s educational needs as they 
currently exist and provide him with a FAPE and any 
necessary special education services.‖  804 F. Supp. 2d at 
255.  As a result, compensatory educational services are 
―subsumed within the education he is currently receiving 
from Georgia,‖ and the court can grant him no effective 
relief.  Id.   
 This ―subsumption‖ theory is incompatible with the 
very notion of compensatory education as a remedy based on 
past harms and it is therefore not supported by our case law.
9
  
                                              
9
 Further, we see no basis to distinguish between out-of-
district, but in-state, moves and out-of-state moves in the 
IDEA or in case law.  Any attempt to draw such a distinction 
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See Lester H., 916 F.2d  at 872 (noting compensatory 
education is a remedy for rights already denied to a special 
needs student).  We must therefore reject the contention 
propounded by Collingswood at oral argument that 
compensatory education would remain available to D.F. had 
he transferred to a private school or begun home schooling, 
but that his transfer to another public school district with its 
own IDEA obligations renders his claim moot.   
 Further, the District Court erred in concluding that 
there was no compensatory education that Collingswood 
could provide once D.F. lived in Georgia.  One accepted form 
of compensatory education relief is the establishment of a 
fund to be spent on the child‘s education, which 
Collingswood would certainly be able to provide if FAPE was 
found to have been denied.  See, e.g., Ferren C., 612 F.3d 712 
(upholding compensatory education fund as appropriate under 
IDEA); Heather D. v. Northampton Area Sch. Dist., 511 F. 
Supp. 2d 549, 562 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (utilizing fund as 
compensatory education remedy).  Further, we have noted 
that there is no ―case law from our sister circuits that supports 
the argument that a court‘s power to grant equitable relief 
                                                                                                     
would raise concerns with regard to the plaintiffs‘ rights to 
interstate travel.  See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) 
(―[T]he ‗constitutional right to travel from one State to 
another‘ is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence.‖ (quoting 
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966))).  But see 
N.P., 2011 WL 463037, at *5 (distinguishing case from S.N. 
because N.P. ―moved to an adjacent school district, rather 
than out of the state entirely‖).   
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under the IDEA is simply limited to monetary awards.‖  
Ferren C., 612 F.3d at 719. 
 Appropriate remedies under the IDEA are determined 
on a case-by-case basis.  ―In each case, a court will evaluate 
the specific type of relief that is appropriate to ensure that a 
student is fully compensated for a school district‘s past 
violations of his or her rights under the IDEA and develop an 
appropriate equitable award.‖  Id. at 720.  The District Court 
also could have ordered Collingswood to pay D.F.‘s new 
district or to contract with a local provider in his new home in 
order to provide tutoring, counseling, or other support 
services.  See Pihl v. Mass. Dep’t. of Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 188 
n.8 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that compensatory education can 
take many forms, including tutoring and summer school).  As 
Collingswood conceded at oral argument, such inter-district 
contracting is a regular part of the resolution of IDEA claims.   
 Because the very purpose of the IDEA would be 
undermined by a contrary holding, we find that the District 
Court erred in asserting that D.F.‘s claims for compensatory 
education were rendered moot when he moved to another 
state.  Of course, we do not intend to restrict the potential 
forms of compensatory education to those discussed above.  
Indeed, we encourage the District Court to consider any form 
of compensatory education proposed.   
22 
 
B. Denial of FAPE 
 Because we find that D.F.‘s claims were not rendered 
moot by his move out of state, we turn next to 
Collingswood‘s argument in the alternative, that D.F. is not 
entitled to compensatory education because he experienced 
no denial of FAPE. 
 The IDEA mandates that all states receiving federal 
education funding must provide FAPE for all disabled 
children.  Id. at 198.  ―The right to a FAPE ensures that 
students with special education needs receive the type of 
education that will ‗prepare them for further education, 
employment, and independent living.‘‖  Ferren C., 612 F.3d 
at 717 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)).  The IDEA also 
requires that disabled children be provided that education in 
the least restrictive environment (―LRE‖), that is, educated 
alongside non-disabled children except when ―the nature or 
severity of the disability of a child is such that education in 
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and 
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.‖  20 U.S.C. § 
1412(a)(5)(A).    
 The IEP is the means of ensuring that each special 
needs child receives FAPE:   
[A] school district that knows or should know 
that a child has an inappropriate  [IEP] or is not 
receiving more than a de minimis educational 
benefit must correct the situation. . . . [I]f it fails 
to do so, a disabled child is entitled to 
compensatory education for a period equal to 
the period of deprivation, but excluding the time 
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reasonably required for the school district to 
rectify the problem. 
 
M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 
(3d Cir. 1996).  This is not ―a bad faith or egregious 
circumstances standard.‖  Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex 
rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 249 (3d Cir. 1999), superseded by 
statute on other grounds as recognized by P.P. v. West 
Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727 (3d Cir. 2009).  Indeed, 
a child‘s entitlement to FAPE is not ―abridged because the 
[school] district's behavior did not rise to the level of 
slothfulness or bad faith.‖  M.C., 81 F.3d at 397.  
 The District Court found, in a footnote, that ―D.F.‘s 
claim for compensatory education for the period of time he 
was not provided a one-to-one aide also fails on the merits 
because Collingswood did not deny him a FAPE during that 
period.‖  804 F. Supp. 2d. at 255 n.6.  This conclusion was 
supported with record evidence including the creation of the 
September 4, 2009 IEP with A.C.‘s consent, the conducting 
of the behavior assessment by Phillip Concors in November 
2009, and the provision of the one-to-one aide in January.
10
  
All of this showed, in the District Court‘s view, that 
                                              
10
 The District Court, appropriately, engaged in ―modified de 
novo‖ review of the ALJ‘s decision.  804 F. Supp. 2d at 254; 
see D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 
2010).  ―Under this standard, a district court must give ‗due 
weight‘ and deference to the findings in the administrative 
proceedings.‖  Id. (citation omitted).  However, the District 
Court did not address the ALJ‘s highly relevant statement that 
―both parties [agree] that the IEP‘s flawed.‖  (Appellant‘s 
App. 282).      
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Collingswood ―acted promptly to attempt to resolve D.F.‘s 
educational issues and meet his educational needs.‖  Id.  
Although we note that parental consent to an IEP does not 
mean that FAPE was provided, Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 250, 
we nonetheless do not find the District Court‘s conclusion to 
this question of fact to be clearly erroneous. 
 However, our inquiry cannot conclude there.  D.F.‘s 
original petition sought compensatory education only for the 
period of time during which he was without a one-to-one 
aide, a claim which the District Court rejected with the 
explanation noted above.  Nonetheless, at the time of the 
ALJ‘s August 4, 2010 order, there were three other pending 
motions that sought compensatory education for other alleged 
violations of D.F.‘s right to FAPE.  First, in his May 26, 2009 
filing, D.F. sought to expand the original petition so that, 
instead of addressing the period of time he was denied a one-
to-one aide, it would cover any denial of FAPE, presumably 
for any reason, during the period of time from September 
2008-January 2009.  (Appellant‘s App. 270-71.)  Second, on 
September 16, 2009, D.F. moved for compensatory education 
to remedy alleged violations of FAPE based on his summer 
2009 ESY placement.  (Id. at 77-86.)  Third, on July 15, 
2010, D.F. filed an additional due process petition seeking 
compensatory education for the entire period of time D.F. had 
not received FAPE in Collingswood, with specific reference 
to improper discipline and use of restraints.
11
  (Id. at 214-15.)   
                                              
11
 The period for which D.F. is potentially entitled to receive 
compensatory education ended on July 1, 2010, when D.F. 
moved out of Collingswood.   
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 The ALJ dismissed this last petition for insufficiency, 
on the ground that it did not contain the necessary 
information relating to the restraints claim.  Then, in her 
August 4, 2010 decision, in which she declared all the claims 
to be moot, the ALJ specifically and separately denied 
―petitioner‘s motion to amend to expand its request for 
compensatory education.‖ 12  (Id. at 240.)  As grounds for this 
decision, she relied on S.N., wherein a request to amend the 
claim for compensatory education was denied based on undue 
delay and mootness, and she cited those same reasons in 
denying D.F.‘s motion.  She made no specific factual findings 
regarding any of the claims for compensatory education.   
  The District Court noted that the ALJ had denied the 
request to expand the compensatory education claim based on 
undue delay and mootness.  804 F. Supp. 2d at 256 n.5.  
Relying upon mootness to dispose of the claims, though, the 
District Court did not make any factual findings that related 
to the claim for compensatory education for violations of 
FAPE beyond the absence of a one-to-one aide during the 
September 2008-January 2009 period, nor any related to the 
summer 2009 compensatory education claim.  Indeed, the 
District Court‘s opinion suggests that D.F. sought only 
―compensatory education for the period that he was not 
provided with a one-to-one aide,‖ id. at 253, although D.F.‘s 
cross-motion for summary judgment made clear that his 
compensatory education claim was broader.   
 Because the District Court did speak substantively on 
the entirety of D.F.‘s claims for compensatory education, our 
holding that these claims are not moot requires us to remand 
                                              
12
 See footnote 6, supra.   
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this matter to the District Court for factual findings on all of 
the alleged violations of FAPE.  We note that the July 2010 
petition was dismissed for insufficiency and thus the claims 
found solely there are not affected by our reversal of the 
District Court‘s mootness ruling.  We further note that, 
because D.F. had not presented any testimony before the ALJ 
when the ALJ declared the claims to be moot, further 
development of the record is likely to be necessary before 
D.F.‘s claims for compensatory education can be properly 
evaluated.   
C. Attorneys‘ Fees 
 D.F. seeks attorneys‘ fees on the ground that the ALJ‘s 
order mandating that Collingswood provide the independent 
psychiatric evaluation and independent behavior analysis 
render him a prevailing party.  The IDEA provides that a 
district court may, in its discretion, award ―reasonable 
attorneys‘ fees‖ to a prevailing party.  20 U.S.C. 
§1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I).  Generally speaking, a prevailing party is 
one who ―succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation 
which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in 
bringing suit.‖  J.O. ex rel. C.O. v. Orange Twp. Bd. of Educ., 
287 F.3d 267, 271 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).  We determine whether 
a party is a prevailing party using a two-pronged test: ―First, 
‗whether plaintiffs achieved relief,‘ and second, ‗whether 
there is a causal connection between the litigation and the 
relief from the defendant.‘‖  Id. (quoting Wheeler v. Towanda 
Area Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 1991)).   
 To satisfy the first prong, the relief obtained need not 
be all of the relief requested, nor must the plaintiff ultimately 
win the case; rather, the plaintiff must merely secure ―some of 
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the benefit sought in the lawsuit.‖  Id. (quoting Wheeler, 950 
F.2d at 131).  To satisfy the second prong, demonstrating 
causation, a plaintiff must show that litigation ―was a material 
contributing factor in bringing about the events that resulted 
in obtaining the desired relief.‖  Wheeler, 950 F.2d at 132 
(citation omitted).  Alternatively, the plaintiff can prevail on a 
catalyst theory, whereby ―even though the litigation did not 
result in a favorable judgment, the pressure of the lawsuit was 
a material contributing factor in bringing about extrajudicial 
relief.‖  Id.   
 The District Court found that D.F. could not 
demonstrate causation, and so it did not engage in any 
analysis as to whether he had succeeded on a significant 
issue.  It grounded its holding on the fact that A.C. had failed 
to make known to Collingswood her desire to have the 
independent evaluations performed before she filed for due 
process.  New Jersey mandates that ―[i]f a parent seeks an 
independent evaluation in an area not assessed as part of an 
initial evaluation or a reevaluation, the school district shall 
first have the opportunity to conduct the requested 
evaluation.‖  N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14-2.5(c)(1).  The 
District Court found that Collingswood had not been given 
this opportunity; moreover, record evidence showed that 
Collingswood had been willing to provide the independent 
evaluations from the time the due process petition was filed.  
As a result, the litigation could not be said to have caused the 
result, and D.F. could not be a prevailing party entitled to 
attorneys‘ fees.     
 D.F. asserts before this Court that the petition was filed 
in January and Collingswood agreed in writing in early 
February to provide the evaluations, but that the ALJ 
nonetheless felt the need to issue an order on June 22 ordering 
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Collingswood to provide the evaluations at its expense.  D.F. 
therefore argues that Collingswood delayed and obstructed 
provision of the evaluations, as there would have been no 
need to issue an order in June if Collingswood had complied 
in a timely fashion.  However, there is evidence in the record 
that A.C. did not provide the names of the experts she had 
selected until June.  Collingswood apparently objected to 
their qualifications, leading the ALJ to issue the order.   
 Thus, we cannot find that the District Court abused its 
discretion in determining that the litigation did not cause 
Collingswood to agree to provide the evaluations.  
Collingswood had agreed from the outset of the litigation to 
provide them and indeed, might have provided them without 
litigation if D.F. had fully complied with New Jersey 
regulations in requesting the evaluations.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
decision of the District Court in part, vacate in part, and 
remand for further proceedings.  
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 I agree with the Court’s disposition of this case. 
 This case presents an unfortunate situation.  D.F. had 
significant special educational needs requiring 
accommodation and presenting a significant challenge to his 
inclusion in a general education classroom.  Apparently, a 
contentious relationship developed between A.C.—D.F.’s 
mother—and school officials, impeding cooperation and 
turning the question of the proper education for D.F. into a 
prolonged litigious struggle involving dueling experts.  These 
circumstances put D.F.’s teachers into a difficult position, 
caught between their legal duties and responsibilities to D.F., 
their responsibility to safeguard other students,
1
 and the legal 
obligations imposed in the course of the due process 
proceedings, particularly the stay-put requirement triggered 
under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). 
 I read the relevant course of events as follows.  At 
D.F.’s initial IEP meeting in fall 2008 when D.F. transferred 
into Collingswood from Camden, A.C. requested that D.F. 
not be placed in the small-class special education 
kindergarten classroom, as recommended by his Camden IEP, 
because his brother was in that class; the school accordingly 
placed D.F. into a regular education classroom.  When it 
became apparent that the placement was inadequate, 
                                              
1
 As the Court notes, by fall 2009 D.F.’s actions, including 
repeated physical attacks on students and teachers, posed a 
serious risk of harm to himself and others. 
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Collingswood agreed to A.C.’s request that a functional 
behavior assessment be performed and began to provide a 
one-to-one classroom aide prior to A.C.’s filing a due process 
petition on January 21, 2009.  The petition triggered the stay-
put requirement. The school developed an additional IEP to 
accommodate D.F., but A.C. declined to participate.
2
  
Meanwhile, D.F.’s behavior continued to disrupt classes 
significantly throughout spring 2009.  At the end of the 
school year, the school district proposed an out-of-district 
placement for D.F., but A.C. insisted on her son’s stay-put 
rights.  In August, the school district filed a motion for 
emergent relief to modify the stay-put order so that it could 
implement the February 2009 IEP or seek an alternative 
placement for D.F.  A.C. opposed this motion, and the ALJ 
denied the district’s request without prejudice.  After the 
events in fall 2009, Collingswood again filed for emergent 
relief, seeking only placement outside the district.  The ALJ 
granted the motion, placing D.F. on home instruction, and 
                                              
2
 As the Court states, this IEP “specifically approved the use 
of physical restraints on D.F.”  The February 26, 2009 IEP 
called for the use of “district-approved Crisis 
Prevention/Intervention (CP/I) techniques” in the event that 
D.F. “is presenting a significant and immediate risk of injury 
to self or others.”  (Appellant’s App. 62-63).  Among the 
possible interventions were various “Personal Emergency 
Interventions” that evidently involved school personnel 
holding D.F. until he displayed safe behavior.  The record 
provides only two pages of what was apparently a twelve-
page IEP. 
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ordered that A.C. cooperate with finding a placement.  D.F. 
was accepted to the Archway School, but A.C. declined to 
allow his transfer there.  The ALJ subsequently found 
Archway to be the appropriate placement.  A.C. appealed and 
did not send D.F. to Archway; she then moved to Georgia, 
mooting all relief except, as we now hold, the compensatory 
education claim. 
 I agree with the Court that resolution of whether D.F. 
received FAPE during the relevant time period is a question 
for the District Court in the first instance.  I also agree that 
more fact-finding may be warranted. 
